Flytrap: Live Cyber Attack Map

A network telescope. Nothing is legitimately hosted on this router, so every connection here is a scan, probe, or bot.

Public data · stats refresh hourly · Last 5 Min delayed by 5 min

Stats last computed: 2026-11-02 04:00:02 UTC

Overview Top Sources Map Search Last 5 Min About

Overview

Average per 5 min

53.8

Last hour (live)

565

Last 24 hours

15,502

Last 30 days

460,178

Top Sources (last 24 hours)

Top 10 Ports

TELNET / 23
911
SSH / 22
302
COAP / 5683
199
HTTPS / 443
148
WWW-HTTP / 80
140
MS-WBT-SERVER / 3389
107
HTTP-ALT / 8080
94
SIP / 5060
74
PCSYNC-HTTPS / 8443
57
DOMAIN / 53
47

Top 10 Networks

Modat B.V. (AS209334)
4951
Hydra Communications Lt…
1705
Google LLC (AS396982)
1417
DigitalOcean, LLC (AS14…
858
Microsoft Corporation (…
442
Pfcloud UG (haftungsbes…
369
Censys, Inc. (AS398324)
355
Scaleway SAS (AS12876)
317
ONYPHE SAS (AS213412)
247
Amazon.com, Inc. (AS146…
246

Top 10 IPs

134.209.74.135/32
562
62.210.142.164/32
284
183.198.226.146/32
192
85.217.140.42/32
171
85.217.140.49/32
170
85.217.140.39/32
169
85.217.140.53/32
169
85.217.140.43/32
166
85.217.140.11/32
165
85.217.140.37/32
163

Suspicious /24 Subnets excludes known-benign scanners (Modat, Censys, etc)

Subnet Unique IPs Total Hits Network(s)
69.5.169.0/24 178 315 Hydra Communications Ltd
162.216.149.0/24 126 155 Google LLC
198.235.24.0/24 111 159 Google LLC
162.216.150.0/24 110 149 Google LLC
147.185.132.0/24 108 147 Google LLC
35.203.210.0/24 108 131 Google LLC
35.203.211.0/24 98 124 Google LLC
199.165.159.0/24 92 110 The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc.
200.138.46.0/24 90 117 Hydra Communications Ltd
147.185.133.0/24 83 117 Google LLC
205.210.31.0/24 82 115 Google LLC
77.67.26.0/24 78 99 Hydra Communications Ltd
86.38.187.0/24 74 92 Hydra Communications Ltd
31.14.254.0/24 72 104 Hydra Communications Ltd
65.49.1.0/24 71 89 Hurricane Electric LLC

Suspicious IPv6 /48 Blocks excludes known-benign scanners

No non-benign IPv6 /48 blocks flagged in this window.

Map

Probes by Country

Last 30 days

460,126 Hits 152 Countries
0
—
delayed 5 min

Last 5 Minutes

Source IP, ASN, country, and destination port only. Our own infrastructure is never shown. Not auto-updating. Use Refresh.

Time (UTC) Source IP Country ASN / Org Port / Service
2026-11-02 04:54:22 147.185.132.64 United States AS396982 Google LLC 23756/tcp
2026-11-02 04:54:18 85.217.140.23 France AS209334 Modat B.V. 7648/tcp (cuseeme)
2026-11-02 04:53:45 71.6.232.29 United States AS10439 CariNet, Inc. 123/udp (ntp)
2026-11-02 04:53:43 199.165.159.217 United States AS22168 The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc. 23556/tcp
2026-11-02 04:53:36 18.119.209.50 United States AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. 8800/tcp (sunwebadmin)
2026-11-02 04:53:35 86.54.31.44 Canada AS12989 Black HOST Ltd 16054/tcp
2026-11-02 04:53:35 159.223.169.30 United States AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 5061/tcp (sips)
2026-11-02 04:53:34 65.49.1.230 United States AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC 23756/tcp
2026-11-02 04:53:31 216.25.89.71 United States AS396982 Google LLC 593/tcp (http-rpc-epmap)
2026-11-02 04:53:21 193.32.209.253 United Kingdom AS25369 Hydra Communications Ltd 3671/tcp (efcp)
2026-11-02 04:53:12 3.147.122.184 United States AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. 88/tcp (kerberos)
2026-11-02 04:52:40 199.165.159.46 United States AS22168 The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc. 18789/tcp
2026-11-02 04:52:23 64.89.163.168 United States AS401626 Netiface America, Inc. 3306/tcp (mysql)
2026-11-02 04:52:22 162.216.150.93 United States AS396982 Google LLC 22323/tcp
2026-11-02 04:51:55 85.217.140.3 France AS209334 Modat B.V. 10390/tcp
2026-11-02 04:51:51 195.178.110.204 Bulgaria AS48090 Techoff Srv Limited 17001/tcp
2026-11-02 04:51:47 199.165.159.66 United States AS22168 The Shadowserver Foundation, Inc. 9998/tcp (distinct32)
2026-11-02 04:51:43 167.94.145.16 United States AS398705 Censys, Inc. 587/tcp (submission)
2026-11-02 04:51:37 206.189.176.162 United States AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 13000/tcp
2026-11-02 04:51:23 85.217.140.35 France AS209334 Modat B.V. 1091/tcp (ff-sm)
2026-11-02 04:51:17 185.224.128.16 The Netherlands AS49870 Alsycon B.V. 443/tcp (https)
2026-11-02 04:50:58 65.49.1.188 United States AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC 6025/tcp
2026-11-02 04:50:53 66.132.195.29 United States AS398324 Censys, Inc. 4282/tcp
2026-11-02 04:50:53 172.203.209.178 United States AS8075 Microsoft Corporation 9999/tcp (distinct)
2026-11-02 04:50:48 65.49.1.62 United States AS6939 Hurricane Electric LLC 82/tcp (xfer)
2026-11-02 04:50:41 77.67.26.195 United States AS25369 Hydra Communications Ltd 18409/tcp
2026-11-02 04:50:40 185.12.59.118 Norway AS50304 Blix Solutions AS 22/tcp (ssh)
2026-11-02 04:50:36 34.197.70.90 United States AS14618 Amazon.com, Inc. 2078/tcp (tpcsrvr)
2026-11-02 04:50:30 162.216.150.89 United States AS396982 Google LLC 47377/tcp
2026-11-02 04:50:16 216.25.89.74 United States AS396982 Google LLC 8991/tcp (https-wmap)
2026-11-02 04:49:58 64.205.72.79 United States AS25369 Hydra Communications Ltd 20682/tcp
2026-11-02 04:49:30 162.216.149.49 United States AS396982 Google LLC 49835/tcp

What this data actually shows

We run a public IP with nothing on it. No website, no mail server, no anything a real visitor would ever want. Anything that connects to it wasn't invited, which makes it a clean way to watch what the internet actually does when nobody's looking.

Right now we're seeing a steady mix of TCP scanning and a smaller, quieter stream of UDP probes. TCP dominates because it's cheap and unambiguous for an attacker to run at scale, a single SYN packet tells you in one round trip whether something's listening. SSH, RDP and Telnet show up constantly, along with SMB, all the classic access points botnets and credential-stuffing tools go after first. We've also watched the same source IP retry an SMTP connection six times in five seconds, which is what an automated relay-hunting script looks like when it doesn't get an answer. The ports named here are the ones worth checking on your own server before a scan finds them for you, and a server check covers the same surface from the outside.

UDP tells a different story. SIP shows up a lot, VoIP infrastructure gets probed heavily and consistently. SNMP and NTP appear too, often from sources checking whether they've found an open amplification target rather than anything aimed at us specifically. SSDP and mDNS point at IoT and device discovery scans. We've seen BACnet, which is a building automation protocol, meaning someone out there is specifically hunting for exposed industrial and facilities control systems. Port 1434 still gets hit occasionally, decades after the Slammer worm made it infamous.

IPv6 barely registers by comparison. Out of everything we log, IPv6 traffic is a tiny fraction of the total, and that gap is really the whole story of why IPv4 gets hammered and IPv6 doesn't. IPv4's address space is small enough that scanning all of it is a weekend project for anyone with a botnet. IPv6 per subnet alone has more addresses than anyone could ever brute-force, so attackers rely on DNS records, certificate transparency logs and leaked lists instead of blind scanning. A telescope with nothing pointing at it from either protocol makes that difference obvious in a way a live production server never would. If you are wondering which of the two your own site answers on, the IPv6 test tells you in a few seconds, and reaching an IPv4-only audience is worth knowing about before it shows up as a support ticket.

None of this is unique to us. Every unused IP on the internet sees roughly this shape of traffic, which is the actual point, this is what the background noise looks like everywhere, all the time, whether anyone's watching or not. The same is true of performance, which is why the aggregate analytics are worth a look alongside this, what a typical site scores says more about the web than any single report does.

How we get this data

Every connection attempt that reaches this IP gets logged before it's dropped. We whitelist our own management access and infrastructure so we're not counting ourselves, everything else that shows up is unsolicited by definition. Each source IP gets enriched against MaxMind's databases for network ownership, ASN and rough geography, and destination ports get matched against IANA's official service name registry so a hit on port 1433 shows up as MS-SQL rather than a bare number.

We also maintain a manual allowlist for networks we've confirmed belong to legitimate internet research, companies like Censys and Onyphe run continuous scanning as their actual business, cataloguing what's reachable rather than trying to break into it. We exclude those from anything we flag as suspicious, since lumping a research crawler in with a credential-stuffing botnet would make the data less useful, not more. This is the same anonymized, aggregated approach behind our Global Analytics data, just pointed at unsolicited traffic instead of site performance.

Questions, feedback, or a benign network request

Write to [email protected] if you want to know whether a network hitting this sensor is yours, or if you need anything else about the data on this page.

Cyber Attack Map Questions

What is a cyber attack map?

Ours is a network telescope. We run a public IP with nothing on it, no website, no mail server, nothing a real visitor would want. Every connection that reaches it is a scan, probe, or bot, so the map is a clean view of unsolicited internet traffic as it happens.

Is my network under attack if I see traffic like this?

Not necessarily. This is internet background noise. Every unused IP sees roughly this shape of traffic all the time, whether anyone is watching or not. What you're looking at is what the internet does in the background everywhere.

Which ports get scanned the most?

SSH, RDP, Telnet and SMB show up constantly, the classic access points botnets and credential-stuffing tools go after first. On UDP, SIP gets probed heavily, along with SNMP and NTP, often as amplification-target checks rather than anything aimed at us specifically.

Why doesn't IPv6 see the same traffic?

IPv6 space is too large to blind-scan. IPv4's address space is small enough that scanning all of it is a weekend project for anyone with a botnet, so attackers fall back on DNS records, certificate transparency logs and leaked lists instead.

How is the data collected?

Every connection attempt gets logged before it's dropped, enriched with MaxMind network ownership, ASN and geography, with destination ports matched against IANA's service registry. Known research scanners like Censys and Onyphe are excluded from anything flagged as suspicious.